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Separation Anxiety: The Implications
of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to
Remove Fault from Divorce
Proceedings
Meghan L. Kruger*

Between 1970 and 1985, the United States experienced an
overhaul in divorce legislation.1 During that time, nearly every
state either replaced or supplemented its fault-based system with
some form of no-fault divorce, which was indicative of the
country’s “widespread dissatisfaction” with the outdated notion
that a party must prove fault in order to be granted a divorce.2
Rhode Island was no exception to the trend and followed suit in
1975, adding “irreconcilable differences” as a ground for obtaining
an absolute divorce in addition to its already existing fault-based
grounds. 3 This new ground was explicitly recognized by Rhode
Island courts as “remov[ing] the fault factor from a divorce
proceeding and abolish[ing] the necessity of presenting what may
be the distasteful details of personal conduct by either party.” 4
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2015; B.A., University of Connecticut, 2010. Many thanks to the Editorial
Board, especially Caitlyn Kelly, for their feedback while drafting this
comment. The title is courtesy of Tom Pagliarini. I am deeply indebted to
my friends and family for the support they have provided me throughout my
academic career and beyond. Above all, my deepest gratitude to my parents
for their unwavering love and guidance over the years.
1. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum,
1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 79 (1991).
2. See id.
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006); Hamel v. Hamel, 426
A.2d 259, 261 (R.I. 1981) (citation omitted).
4. Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261 (citation omitted).
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However, in Rhode Island, no-fault divorce is an illusion.
While, in theory, a marriage can be dissolved without a showing of
fault, fault is still statutorily preserved as a factor for
consideration in several of the most important, and most litigated,
determinations arising from a divorce: the division of marital
assets, awarding alimony and the determination of child custody. 5
It is in these latter portions of the divorce proceeding that either
or both parties can provide evidence of fault of the other in an
effort to get a “bigger slice of the pie.” 6
Section 15-5-3.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws states that
“[a] divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed,
irrespective of the fault of either party, on the ground of
irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage” and provides that “allegations or
evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper and
inadmissible.” 7 Nevertheless, and quite curiously, the statute
goes on to list determinations “pursuant to §§ 15-5-16 [alimony
and counsel fees] and 15-5-16.1 [assignment of property]” as well
as child custody, as exceptions to the no-fault rule. 8 Besides being
blatantly contradictory on its face—making evidence of fault
“improper and inadmissible” on the one hand, yet permitting it to
aid in determining the most important concerns stemming from a
divorce on the other—this construction undermines the
underlying goals of the no-fault system and undercuts the reasons
why most states shifted to no-fault divorce in the first place. The
shift to a no-fault system was, among other things, largely
5. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); Mattera v.
Mattera, 669 A.2d 538, 541 (R.I. 1996) (holding that a trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in considering that the wife was “a ‘good and faithful
wife’ whose marital conduct was impeccable [while the husband’s] marital
conduct included the abuse of alcohol and ‘a bigamous relationship with
another female during the course of the within divorce proceedings.’”); Tarro
v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 561 (R.I. 1984) (noting that “‘[c]onduct’ [within the
context of section 15-5-16] is not limited to bad conduct or marital fault but
also encompasses good conduct during the term of the marriage”).
6. See, e.g., Giammarco v. Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 534 (R.I. 2008)
(affirming a magistrate’s award of 65% of the marital state to the plaintiff
where, in addition to presenting other inferior qualities, the defendant was
“totally at fault in the breakdown of the marriage”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1.
8. Id.
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thought to dignify the divorce process by reducing hostility
between parties, increasing personal dignity, cultivating respect
for the law, and respecting the inherent privacy that society
believes exists between married couples.9
By preserving a
consideration of fault, especially pertaining to the most important
aspects of a divorce proceeding, one can easily see how these goals
would be seriously undermined. It is almost as if the statute was
paying lip service to the no-fault movement, conveying its loyalty,
though quite insincerely.
A survey of Rhode Island case law demonstrates how
pervasive fault actually is in this supposed no-fault system.10
Since courts are bound by the “clear and unambiguous” language
of the statute and because of the undoubtedly clear and
unambiguous language in section 15-5-3.1, Rhode Island courts
have in effect been forced to explicitly consider fault. 11 Thus,
their opinions are replete with evidence of less than stellar
conduct by one or both of the divorcing parties—despite the fact
that this is just the type of thing no-fault divorce sought to
eliminate.
This comment focuses on a troubling inconsistency in Rhode
Island divorce law: namely, how a divorce can be obtained
“irrespective of the fault of either party,” with “allegations or
evidence of specific acts of misconduct” considered to be
“improper” pursuant to section 15-5-3.1, yet fault can explicitly be
considered when dividing marital property consistent with section
15-5-16.1.12 It first provides a brief history of divorce in the
United States and outlines how and why the move from a faultbased system to a largely no-fault regime occurred. Next, it
discusses how moving to a no-fault system requires re-evaluating
9. Wardle, supra note 1, at 79, 96.
10. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160, 1162 (R.I. 1994)
(holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding the wife
65% of assets where she suffered emotional and physical abuse during the
marriage, even though she was not faultless in its eventual breakdown);
Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 564 (R.I. 1984) (concluding that equitable
division of marital property was proper where both parties were at fault).
11. See Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 1192 (R.I. 2006).
12. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16.1
(West 2006).
This paper does not address considering fault when
determining alimony, which is now largely used only as a rehabilitative
measure pursuant to section 15-5-16 or child custody because of the
extraordinary concerns pertaining to the well-being of children.
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how marital property is divided, how Rhode Island considers fault
in both the granting of divorces and dividing marital property, and
why this is problematic. Finally, it discusses how the goals of the
no-fault divorce system would be better served by implementing
an equal, or at the very least, equitable division of assets,
irrespective of fault.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Under English law, no common law right to a divorce existed:
an unhappy couple could seek “only a limited right to a legal
separation from the ecclesiastical court,” “a court having
jurisdiction over matters concerning the Church of England.” 13 In
the years leading up to the Revolution, most colonists remained
largely subject to the laws of England, which permitted divorce
only by an act of Parliament.14 Following the Revolution, the
American states drifted away from the strict requirements of
England and started passing their own divorce laws. 15
Early divorce laws differed dramatically by region. New
England enacted liberal divorce laws quickly, allowing divorce on
a number of grounds, while the Southern states granted divorce
only under the strictest requirements, if at all.16 Mid-Atlantic
States passed intermediate divorce laws between these two
extremes, allowing for legal divorces, but only on limited grounds,
such as New York’s 1787 law that only permitted divorce for
adultery. 17
Influenced largely by the principles advanced by the
Protestant Reformation, wherein the doctrines and structure of
the Roman Catholic Church 18 were rejected in favor of a less
13. 1 MASS. PRACTICE Family Law and Practice § 1:5 (4th ed. 2013);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (9th ed. 2009).
14. See Michael M. O’Hear, “Some of the Most Embarrassing Questions”:
Extratterritorial Divorces and the Problem of Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer,
104 YALE L.J. 1507, 1511 (1995).
15. Id.
16. Id. South Carolina, for example, did not grant divorces. Id.
17. Id.
18. By the ninth century, the Roman Catholic Church had largely gained
exclusive control over matrimonial issues throughout Europe. See Shaakirrah
R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the Western Legal Tradition, 50
LOY. L. REV. 407, 412 (2004). The Church’s view on marriage can be stated
quite simply – “a valid celebrated Christian marriage was dissoluble only by
the death of one of the spouses.” Id. at 413 (internal quotation marks
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stringent Protestant church, 19 the founders of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony were the first to advance the idea of a right to an
absolute divorce in the United States.20 In the absence of
religious courts in the New World, the task of determining marital
status, by default, fell to the government. 21 Thus, the
Massachusetts General Court established the Court of Assistants
in 1636, whose jurisdiction included “all Causes of divorce.” 22
Thereafter, in 1674, the Court of Assistants first approved a
petition brought by a woman seeking “legal divorcement from hir
[sic] husband” because he was “married to another woman in
London;” however, it is unclear as to whether, based on the timing
of the peripheral marriage, the declaration actually sought a
nullity of the marriage versus a divorce. 23 Regardless, others
followed suit, seeking a right to divorce for reasons such as
adultery and desertion. 24 Following Pennsylvania, in 1786,
Massachusetts was the second state to officially pass divorce
legislation. 25
The Massachusetts Court of Assistants also recognized an
early version of dividing marital assets between a separating
husband and wife. Shortly before the American Revolution,
Abigail Fuller, in divorcing her husband, sought the exclusive
right to use her own estate and sought support of herself and her
child.26 She was granted the estate and was awarded spousal and
child support “in the amount of 25 pounds of sterling a year.”27 It
omitted). Some alternative remedies existed to dissolve a marriage, such as
annulment, a non-consummated marriage, or a grant of separation, however
these were rarely utilized. Id. at 413–14.
19. See id. at 415 (“[F]rom the sixteenth century onward the
acceptability of divorce underwent a renaissance as . . . Protestant Reformers
denied . . . that marriage was a holy sacrament, as endorsed by the Roman
Catholic Church, and advocated the possibility of divorce under certain
circumstances.”).
20. 1 MASS. PRACTICE Family Law and Practice § 1:5 (4th ed. 2013).
Divorce still remained largely unheard of in the Mid-Atlantic and Southern
colonies at this time because of the more pervasive influence of the Church of
England on these regions than in New England. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1:5 n.5. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. § 1:5 (internal quotation marks omitted); Id. § 1:5 n.5.
24. See id. § 1:5.
25. O’Hear, supra note 14, at 1511.
26. 1 MASS. PRACTICE Family Law and Practice § 1:5 (4th ed. 2013).
27. Id.
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is from these origins that divorce law was created and, ever so
slowly, began to evolve.
A. Fault-based Divorce
Early divorce law centered on the notion that marriage was
“an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested.” 28 The idea of requiring fault by at least one
party to a divorce presumably grew out of a desire to preserve the
“institution” of marriage. 29 Traditionally, only an innocent party
could petition for a divorce, and divorce laws required that such a
party prove his or her significant other committed one of any of
the statutorily enumerated offenses constituting fault.30 Though
they varied from state to state, adultery, cruelty, and desertion
were among the most common fault grounds.31
Several defenses arose in response to fault-based divorce,
including a “clean hands” type defense, wherein if both parties
were at fault, then neither could obtain a divorce.32 Other
defenses included connivance, which required a showing that the
innocent spouse consented to the alleged offense, and condonation,
wherein the innocent spouse forgave the marital indiscretion such
that the indiscretion was then “nullified.” 33 In an effort to get
around the fault requirement, some couples seeking a divorce even
went so far as to engage in collusion by “alleging false evidence of
a marital offense.” 34 Collusion, forum shopping (to find the most
favorable divorce laws), and marriage recognition issues amongst
the states were early indicators of a defective fault-based system
and a need for a more uniform approach. 35
A number of social, economic, and cultural changes beginning
in the early twentieth century contributed to creating an
environment ripe for divorce reform to surface in the United
28. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
29. See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting
Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 609 (1996)
30. Laura Bradford, the Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent
Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 610 (1997).
31. Id. Other types of fault included “conviction of certain crimes,
homosexuality, insanity, and drug addiction.” Id.
32. Id.
33. Morse, supra note 29, at 611–12.
34. Id. at 612.
35. O’Hear, supra note 14, at 1511–12.
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States. Herbert Jacob, a political science professor at
Northwestern University and author of Silent Revolution: The
Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States, suggests a
number of factors that may have contributed to a shift in attitude
towards divorce: an increased life expectancy amongst women
(presumably due in part to a consistent decrease in mortality
during childbirth), increased participation by women in the labor
force (thus making them less financially dependent on their
husbands), and the effects of the feminist movement beginning in
the 1960s, to name a few. 36 Additionally, the 1980s saw a
downturn in “child centered” marriages, with more married
couples waiting to have children, or deciding against doing so
altogether.37 Jacob notes:
These social and economic changes altered the context of
married life in the United States. The marriage vow,
‘until death do us part,’ had new meaning when life
extended almost twice as long in the 1980s as in the
1900s. The long period without children and the financial
contribution of women modified relationships between
wives and husbands. Husbands could no longer
automatically claim autocratic dominance and wives
more often sought a greater degree of equality. Most
significantly, however, the focus of marriages shifted from
children and economics to companionship. 38
These significant changes in the social attitude toward
marriage provided an open invitation for legislative reform of
divorce laws.
II. THE MOVEMENT TO NO-FAULT DIVORCE

Early efforts to reform divorce law had mixed results, with

36. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 16–24 (1998).
37. Id. at 25. Jacob suggests that the invention of contraception, along
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, in 1973, legalizing
abortion, made it “possible to separate sexual activity from the probability of
procreation,” thus resulting in more childless marriages, and contributing to
an attitude that marriage was no longer “the only acceptable context for
sexual activity.” Id.
38. Id. at 27–28.
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New York making the first serious attempt at reform in, 1966. 39
However, because New York had the strictest divorce laws in the
country at the time—originally enacted in 1787 and permitting
divorce only on the grounds of adultery—the reform sought was
nothing groundbreaking; rather, people believed it did “no more
than bring the state’s law into the twentieth century.”40 Other
states also made minor attempts at reform, such as offering, or
sometimes requiring, “conciliation procedures” before a final
divorce was granted. 41 This approach appears to be an attempt to
balance a right to a divorce with an interest in ensuring divorces
were only granted to couples who had exhausted all reconciliatory
options. 42
The appropriate context for reform proved crucial to make any
serious headway in divorce reform, and California, with its
seemingly laidback lifestyle, superficial values, and reputation “as
an incubator for novel social ideas” was just the place. 43 In 1969,
California became the first state to adopt a purely “no-fault”
divorce approach by passing the Family Law Act of 1969 (“the
Act”), which became effective the following year. 44 The legislation
was enacted as a proposed solution to the rising divorce rate and
to promote family stability, which was coupled with the
implementation of a state family court system.45 The Governor’s
Commission, who was tasked with studying and proposing
changes to divorce and family law, and ultimately set forth the
Act, which “urged the abandonment of all fault grounds,” partially
based on the belief that fault grounds promoted “undue stigma”
and “antagonism” between married couples. 46 The Act eliminated
39. Id. at 30. The 1966 revision added additional grounds for divorce
including “abandonment, imprisonment of a spouse in excess of three years,
cruel and inhuman treatment, and living separately and apart from one’s
spouse for a period, originally, of two or more years pursuant to a separation
agreement.” Meaghan E. Howard, Modern Reformation: An Overview of New
York’s Domestic Relations Law Overhaul, 29 TOURO L. REV. 389, 391 (2013).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 31.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 43.
44. Wardle, supra note 1, at 83.
45. Id. at 83–84.
46. J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce
Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 583 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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all previous fault grounds for divorce, and allowed for “dissolution
of marriage” only upon the ground of “irreconcilable differences
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage”
or “incurable insanity.” 47 Evidence of marital misconduct was not
only unnecessary following the Act, it was inadmissible.48
Interestingly, the Act was signed into law by then-Governor
Ronald Reagan, who later said it was “one of the biggest mistakes
of his political life.” 49
Around the same time as the passage of the Act, the highly
regarded National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (“NCCUSL”) 50 voted to propose the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act (“UMDA”), under which the sole grounds for divorce
was to be a no-fault ground. 51 Further, the UMDA proposed that
“property division, spousal maintenance, and child support
decisions were to be made ‘without regard to marital
misconduct.” 52 Although the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
declined to endorse the UMDA in its original form for a number of
reasons, after some revisions, the ABA approved the UMDA.53
The NCCUSL and ABA presenting a united front proved vital to

47. Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. From 1970 to 1975, evidence of marital misconduct was allowed
to be presented to the courts in an effort to assist the court in determining
whether irreconcilable differences were present between the couple, however
this provision was repealed in 1975, thereby making fault completely
irrelevant. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 46, at 583–84.
49. W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Fall
2009),
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-evolution-ofdivorce. Wilcox suggests that one reason Reagan may have supported the bill
was because his first wife, Jane Wyman, had “unfairly accused him of ‘mental
cruelty’ to obtain a divorce in 1948.” Id.
50. The NCCUSL, established in 1892 and now known as the Uniform
Law Commission (“ULC”), is a non-profit, non-partisan group made up of
“practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law
professors, who have been appointed . . . to research, draft and promote
enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is
desirable and practical.” About the ULC, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last
visited Feb. 19, 2014). ULC members work together to create a model or
recommended act, such as the UMDA, and then individual members work to
enact the recommended or model acts in their home jurisdictions. Id.
51. Wardle, supra note 1, at 87.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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the success of nationwide divorce reform.54
Following California’s lead and the ABA’s approval of the
UMDA, the no-fault movement began to spread across the
country. By 1989, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
had adopted some no-fault ground for divorce, with twenty of the
states providing for divorce solely on no-fault grounds.55 In 2010,
New York became the final state to enact a “true” no-fault divorce,
adding as a ground for a unilateral (or non-consensual) divorce
that “the relationship between husband and wife has broken down
irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one
party has so stated under oath.” 56
However, California’s no-fault legislation was not quite as
groundbreaking as it seems. Prior to 1970, several states had a
no-fault provision embedded in their fault-based divorce laws,
usually based on couples living apart for a proscribed period of
time. 57 For example, a Rhode Island law that dates back to 1893,
allowed for divorce of married couples who lived apart for ten
or more years, and Wisconsin had a similar law dating back to
1866.58 So, the seeds of no-fault divorce had been sewn for some
time. But, what was unique about California’s legislation was
that it eliminated all prior fault grounds available in divorce
actions in favor of an exclusively no-fault system.59
Though seemingly counter-intuitive, the legislative intent
behind enacting the Family Law Act of 1969 was to counter the
rising divorce rates by making it more difficult to obtain a
divorce. 60 The emphasis was on “dissolving only the truly
hopeless marriages,” and the courts were tasked with determining
whether “‘substantial reasons’ for abandoning the marriage” were
present, whereby judges would make an independent
54. See Harvey L. Zuckman, The ABA Family Law Section v. The
NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation and Forced Reconciliation over the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 73–74 (1974).
55. Wardle, supra note 1, at 88.
56. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law: Working Toward More Uniformity in Laws Relating to Families,
44 FAM. L.Q. 469, 497 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875,
886 (2000).
58. Id. at 887.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 903.
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determination as to the status of the marriage. 61 Taking its
charge with only dissolving those marriages that were “truly
hopeless” very seriously, the California Supreme Court specifically
rejected the idea that the parties could consent to dissolving their
marriage and have that consent be sufficient to establish
irreconcilable differences between the couple. 62
Additionally, a no-fault divorce scheme was thought to dignify
the divorce process and reduce the strain on a family’s emotional
and financial resources at time when these resources are most
crucial.63 Requiring a finding of fault in divorce proceedings often
resulted in “costly, bitter, counterproductive litigation that
impeded reconciliation.” 64 Jacob, again, sums this notion up
nicely:
[A] widespread cause for dissatisfaction with the divorce
law was that is forced family disputes into the
adversarial mode of court actions. Most divorce cases
already had an uncomfortably high degree of emotional
conflict. Many divorce attorneys felt that the
requirements of the adversarial system heighted that
conflict to unacceptable levels . . . The system seemed
designed to promote and exacerbate conflict, rather than
to provide a way to find compromises and to get the
divorce in as painless a fashion as possible.65
Certainly it was also a concern that the children of the parties
suffered the most as a result of the hostility brought about by the
divorce process. 66 So, it was believed that by sparing the
divorcing parties the requirement of proving fault, hostility
amongst the separating parties would decrease, and the children,
if any, would be better off. 67
61. Id. at 903–04.
62. See In re Marriage of McKim, 493 P.2d 868, 872 (Cal. 1972).
63. Wardle, supra note 1, at 92.
64. Id.
65. JACOB, supra note 36, at 68.
66. Wardle, supra note 1, at 92.
67. Id. at 92–93. Wardle’s article also discusses several other arguments
put forth in support of a shift to no-fault divorce, including preserving the
integrity of the legal system generally, as well as bridging the gap between
“divorce law as written and divorce law as applied.” Id. at 93–94. She states
that no-fault divorces were widely available prior to the 1970s shift in
legislation, either through collusion by both of the parties or via migratory
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As the idea no-fault divorce began to catch on, though
contrary to California’s original intent, proponents of the no-fault
system used it to promote the “assertion that divorce was a
private matter that the state had no legitimate interest to restrict
when the marriage was irretrievably broken and the parties had
agreed to terminate the marriage.” 68
By eliminating a
requirement of fault, divorcing parties were protected from having
to disclose in a court of law “the most intimate and often
embarrassing details of married life.” 69 Many believed that the
state’s interest in protecting the institution of marriage no longer
justified “requiring disclosure of the marriage’s failings if it was
undisputed by the parties that the marriage was irretrievably
broken.” 70
III. THE NEW STANDARD

The UMDA suggested that fault grounds for divorce be
replaced with a sole standard: the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage. The drafters of the UMDA thought that having one
single standard would “redirect the law’s attention from an
unproductive assignment of blame to a search for the realities of
the marital situation.” 71 In short, while difficult for some
divorcing parties to understand, the single standard approach
supported the notion that once a marriage was over, it was futile
to try to figure out where to assign blame. Rather, more times
than not, determining fault would just “bog the court down into
divorce. Id. at 94. Because of the problems with migratory divorce, it was
also believed that more uniformity needed to exist amongst the states with
regard to divorce law, which in turn led to the proposal of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act by the NCCUSL. Id. at 96. See also Peter Nash
Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM L.Q. 269,
270–71 (1997) (Under the fault-based divorce regime, couples in unhappy
marriages often fabricated fault based grounds for divorce or resorted to
perjury in an effort to obtain a divorce, often with the assistance of counsel.
Wealthier couples could bypass the process by obtaining divorces from more
lenient states, referred to as “divorce mills,” or from various foreign countries
that offered “quickie” divorces).
68. Id. at 96.
69. See Joseph Goldstein & Max Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for
Divorce: A Model Statute and Commentary, 3 FAM L.Q. 75, 82 (1969).
70. Wardle, supra note 1, at 96.
71. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101–309, prefatory note
(amended 1973), 9A U.L.A 159, 161 (1998).
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considering emotionally charged factual issues which are often
more relevant to the parties themselves than to the attorneys or
the court.” 72 Additionally, as one can imagine, rarely would it be
the case that the deterioration of a marriage was the fault of
exclusively one party.
The “irreconcilable differences” standard, which is similar to
the “irretrievable breakdown of the marriage” standard that is set
forth by the UMDA, is present in several state divorce statutes
including Rhode Island. 73 The standard, a popular ground upon
which celebrity couples file for divorce (likely because this
standard is the relevant one under California law), requires not
only a showing that irreconcilable differences exist between the
parties, but either explicitly through statute, as is the case in
Rhode Island, or through “judicial construction . . . that [the]
differences have caused an irremediable breakdown of the
marriage.” 74 Again, this standard was implemented to “provide a
less painful alternative to traditional grounds for divorce . . . by
removing from domestic relations litigation the issue of marital
fault as a determining factor.” 75
A. Rhode Island Adds “Irreconcilable Differences”
Rhode Island followed the nationwide trend and added
irreconcilable differences as a no-fault grounds for divorce in 1975,
currently codified in section 15-5-3.1 of the Rhode Island General
72. Brett R. Turner, The Role of Marital Misconduct in Dividing
Property upon Divorce, 15 DIVORCE LITIG. 117, 118 (2003).
73. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006). Irreconcilable
differences is also an appropriate ground for legal separation, also known as
separation from bed and board. See Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 261 (R.I.
1981).
74. See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005).
75. Id. However, when a party proceeds in divorce litigation under the
irreconcilable differences standard, this does not preclude the opposing party
from proceeding under a fault based standard where such standards are
available by statute. See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 459 A.2d 282, 284 (N.H. 1983)
(holding it was error to require two separate decrees of divorce when husband
wanted to proceed on the fault based grounds of adultery and wife wanted to
proceed on the no-fault grounds of irreconcilable differences). But, where
both irreconcilable differences and misconduct are pleaded, and “it appears
that the parties separated as a result of mutual differences before the
misconduct occurred,” irreconcilable differences is the appropriate grounds
upon which to grant the divorce. See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005) (citing
Murano v. Murano, 442 A.2d 597, 601 (N.H. 1982)).
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Laws.76 There is little information about the circumstances
surrounding the General Assembly’s decision to implement nofault grounds. Rather, it appears that Rhode Island was simply
following the trend, and adding a no-fault ground was the next
logical step. But, looking at what was perhaps the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s first opportunity to interpret the irreconcilable
differences ground suggests that the ground was enacted to
comport with many of the same goals of no-fault divorce that other
jurisdictions were looking to achieve. 77 In Hamel v. Hamel, the
court interpreted irreconcilable differences, albeit as it applied to
a divorce from bed and board (i.e. a legal separation) versus an
absolute divorce, as clearly removing the “fault factor from divorce
proceedings” and “abolish[ing] the necessity of presenting what
may be the distasteful details of personal conduct by either
party.” 78
The court in Hamel also cited a Texas Court of Appeals case,
Baxla v. Baxla, for its discussion of the policy goals underlying nofault divorce. 79 In that case, the court, although recognizing there
had not “yet been time for much judicial interpretation” of new nofault divorce statutes, still stated with ample conviction that it
was
manifestly clear from the legislative history of many, if
not all, of the statutes, that the purpose and intent of the
legislatures of the various states, including Texas, is to
abolish the necessity of presenting sordid and ugly details
of conduct on the part of either spouse to the marriage in
order to obtain a decree of divorce. 80
The Baxla court went on to say that “legislators believed that
removing considerations of fault and eliminating the incentive to
present fault evidence would materially reduce the bitterness and
acrimony which had attended divorce proceedings.” 81 The Rhode
76. See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261; see also Ronald J. Resmini, The Law of
Domestic Relations in Rhode Island, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 408 (1995).
Additional fault-based grounds for divorce remained available to divorcing
parties. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-2 (West 2006).
77. See Turner, supra note 72, at 118–19.
78. See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261.
79. Id.
80. Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
81. Id.
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Island Supreme Court’s interpretation of the irreconcilable
differences standard in Hamel and its reliance on the discussion in
Baxla suggests that the standard was in fact implemented to
achieve the frequently cited policy goals underlying no-fault
divorce. 82 As I will unearth, however, the current construction
and application of section 15-5-3.1, with its explicit preservation of
fault, makes it difficult (if not impossible) to achieve these goals.
A. Applying the New Standard
It is well settled in jurisdictions using the irreconcilable
differences standard that whether the differences between the
parties are irreconcilable is a determination to be made by the
court. 83 If the court determines that the differences are in fact
irreconcilable, a second similar inquiry is performed by the court
to determine whether those differences have resulted in the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage.84 The court uses a
subjective test to make this determination, using the parties’ state
of mind as a frame of reference.85 However, the differences need
not be considered irreconcilable by both parties.86
Unless
required by statute, consent by both parties for a divorce on this
ground is not required. 87
Ironically, the inquiry by the court in determining whether
the differences between the parties are in fact irreconcilable
82. See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261; See Baxla, 522 S.W.2d at 738; See
Turner, supra note 72, at 118–19.
83. See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005) (citing Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d
558, 560 (R.I. 1984)). As an aside, the husband’s attorney in Hamel makes an
interesting argument that no differences are truly irreconcilable. See 426
A.2d at 261. He argued, “[a] perfect example is World War II. We had an
irreconcilable difference with Japan, and then ‘whammo,’ we reconciled the
difference.” Id.
84. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005).
85. Id.
86. Id. Some courts may consider the fact that one spouse wishes to
continue the marriage as “evidence of reasonable possibility of reconciliation”
but, “if [the] other spouse resolutely refuses to continue marriage and it is
clear from passage of time or other circumstances that there is no reasonable
possibility of change of heart, there is irremediable breakdown of marriage.”
Id. at n.14; see Desrochers v. Desrochers, 347 A.2d 150, 153 (N.H. 1975).
87. Id. South Dakota, for example, requires consent by both parties to
grant a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, unless a party
fails to appear. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-17.2 (2013); MISS. CODE. ANN.
§ 93-5-2 (West 2007).

KRUGERFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

REMOVING FAULT FROM DIVORCE

4/20/2014 2:02 PM

823

requires some consideration of fault by one or both of the parties.
In the oft-cited Rhode Island Supreme Court case Tarro v. Tarro,
the Court upheld a trial judge’s finding of fact that both parties
were responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. 88 In
reaching this conclusion, the trial judge explicitly considered
evidence of the husband’s “alleged adulterous relationship.”89
Despite the fact that the Court noted that fault had been “largely
eliminated as a factor in Rhode Island divorce proceedings,” and
applauded its shift to a more modern no-fault system, it held that
the trial judge’s conclusion that the parties were equally at fault
for the breakdown of the marriage was not erroneous.90 The irony
of this decision is apparent given the fact that Rhode Island law
not only sought to eliminate a showing of fault by the parties to a
divorce proceeding from a policy standpoint, but unambiguously
provides that “allegations or evidence of specific acts of
misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible.” 91 Rather, in
light of the goals behind no-fault divorce, the focus should be on
the state of the marriage as it currently exists, and not who was
responsible for getting it to that state.
IV. DIVIDING MARITAL ASSETS

The actual dissolution of the marriage is only half the battle
in divorce litigation. Thus, the backhand consideration of fault in
determining whether irreconcilable differences exist between a
married couple is of minimal concern when one is alerted to the
fact that fault is explicitly considered in Rhode Island’s law
governing the division of marital assets, as well as when awarding
alimony and legal costs and fees. 92
Alimony and property division are the two primary
procedures by which property is distributed amongst divorcing
parties.93 Historically, these mechanisms were created as a
88. Tarro, 485 A.2d at 561.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006); See also 27A C.J.S.
Divorce § 31 (2005) (“the determination whether irreconcilable differences
exist should not be controlled by fault of the parties.”).
92. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1. Fault is also considered when
determining child custody and visitation; however, that is beyond the scope of
this paper.
93. JACOB, supra note 36, at 112.
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means to support the wife following a divorce. 94
Because
marriage was considered a “lifelong obligation,” a wife was
entitled to receive alimony following a divorce as a means to
support herself for the rest of her life, or at the very least, until
she remarried and could depend on another husband for financial
support. 95 When alimony alone was not enough, a wife could be
awarded some of the husband’s property upon divorce to make up
the difference.96 Central to both of these concepts of was the idea
that following a divorce, most women would be unable to support
themselves on their own, and thus, they required some form of
continued financial support. 97
Traditionally, fault was an important consideration in
determining alimony and property division following a divorce,
with the at-fault spouse often being penalized in the process.98
For example, in many states, a wife who had committed adultery
during the course of the marriage was not eligible for alimony. 99
In some community property 100 states, such as California, the
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In turn, alimony and the transfer of property also decreased the
likelihood that divorced women would have to rely on public assistance
programs, such as welfare, following divorce. Id.
98. Id. at 113.
99. Id. at 112.
100. In community property states, such as California, “all property
acquired after marriage, by either husband or wife” is presumed to be
“common property,” with the exception of that property acquired by “gift,
bequest, devise or descent.” Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247, 251 (1859). The
presumption can be rebutted by “clear and decisive proof” that the property
was purchased using the separate funds of either spouse. Id. at 252. Then
Chief Justice Stone of the California Supreme Court said about community
property:
The statute proceeds upon the theory that the marriage, in respect
to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry
to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the
property after dissolution . . . To the community all acquisitions by
either, whether made jointly or separately, belong.
Id. at 251. The community property concept was derived from Spanish law,
and is mostly present in the Western states, including California, Texas, New
Mexico and Arizona. Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of CommunitySource Property Acquired in Another State (and Its Impact on A Montana
Marriage Dissolution, Estate Planning, Property Transfers, and Probate), 69
MONT. L. REV. 313, 322–23 (2008).
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innocent spouse was eligible for more than the traditional “half” of
the community property, and in common law states, 101 an at-fault
wife was not eligible for any of the husband’s property upon
divorce. 102
As fault was beginning to be eliminated from divorce
proceedings, it became necessary for the legislature and the courts
to reconsider the relevant facts for determining alimony and
property division following a divorce.
When the NCCUSL
proposed its no-fault system through the UMDA, it also proposed
that fault be eliminated from consideration when dividing marital
property and awarding alimony. 103 Jacob cites Professor Robert
Levy, who pitched his idea to the NCCUSL, to articulate the logic
behind removing fault from determining alimony and property
division: the purpose of no fault divorce—to remove the need to
argue over misbehavior throughout the course of the marriage—
could not possibly be achieved if the argument was still preserved
for alimony and property division. 104 Professor Levy also
recommended that common law states adopt a “marital property”
standard, similar to that of community property states, which was
to include “all assets acquired during the marriage, regardless of
which spouse happened to hold title.” 105 Levy alluded to the fact
that an equal distribution of the assets would be most appropriate
so as to “minimize conflict” throughout the property division
process, though, for reasons political or otherwise, he did not
explicitly endorse the idea.106 Yet, Levy’s most revolutionary
proposal was something no state had really considered before: he
suggested that a wife’s homemaking services be considered as a
contribution to the marital estate in the same way that the
husband’s wages earned outside of the home had customarily been
101. In common law states, property acquired by one spouse during the
course of the marriage does not automatically become property of the
marriage; rather, it can be owned by either spouse, and “is held jointly only
when one or both spouses elect to take title jointly or property is gifted to
spouses as co-owners.” See Emily Osborn, The Treatment of Unearned
Separate Property at Divorce in Common Law Property Jurisdictions, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 903, 906 (1990).
102. JACOB, supra note 36, at 113.
103. Id. at 117.
104. Id. at 118.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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considered. 107
Adjusting property division and alimony law in conjunction
with a shift to a no-fault system was easier for some states than
others.
California, for example, already had a community
property standard, wherein all property acquired during the
marriage, unless proven otherwise, was joint property that was to
be split equally upon divorce. 108 After adopting no-fault divorce,
the only adjustment required for California law was a removal of
its permission to allow the innocent party in a divorce to receive
more than half of the community property.109 The result is
California’s current statute, which provides that upon divorce or
legal separation of the parties, the community estate is to be
divided equally. 110 This statute appears to be a reflection of the
true no-fault system that Professor Levy had in mind. Though
slower to catch on than no-fault divorce, by the mid-1980s most
states had changed their standards pertaining to the division of
property upon divorce by adopting the “marital property” idea,
and, in many states fault was no longer a consideration when
dividing the marital assets. 111
Today, in most states, the division of marital assets upon
divorce is considered much like that of the dissolution of a
business partnership, consistent with the UMDA’s suggestion. 112
The view that marriage is a “shared enterprise” is the idea that
each party is entitled to a share of the assets following dissolution
of the marriage, regardless of who holds title to the property, so
long as the property was accrued during the course of the
107. Id.
108. Id. at 113.
109. Id. at 120.
110. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004).
Additionally, alimony was
111. JACOB, supra note 36, at 121.
transformed from a permanent device to support an innocent ex-wife, at least
until she re-married, into a temporary payment system until the wife could
support herself. Id. at 125. Rhode Island’s current structure for alimony
reflects this idea. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013) (“Alimony is designed to provide support for a spouse for a reasonable
length of time to enable the recipient to become financially independent and
self-sufficient.”).
112. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101–309, prefatory note
(amended 1973), 9A U.L.A 159, 161 (1998) (“the distribution of property upon
the termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like
the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership.”).
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marriage. 113 In the majority of jurisdictions, marital misconduct
is considered only in circumstances where it has an economic
impact on the marital estate. 114 Some courts in jurisdictions that
use an equitable division of the assets standard have held that
fault is simply not relevant when deciding what property belongs
to which party, but rather “each spouse should receive his or her
fair share of what has been accumulated during the marriage.
The concept of fault is not relevant to such distribution since all
that is being [a]ffected is the allocation to each party of what
really belongs to him or her.” 115 In short, if one party is at fault
for the breakdown of the marriage, that does not undermine his or
her contribution to the marital estate.
Other courts have
subscribed to the belief that “[d]ivorce is not a vehicle by which
one spouse is compensated . . . for having had to suffer during the
marriage.” 116 Additionally, consistent with the reasoning for
removing fault from divorce is the understanding that fault can be
difficult to prove, is highly personal in nature, and can often be
traced to both parties.117
But, where martial misconduct has a direct effect on the
couple’s assets, most states have held that such misconduct is in
fact relevant.118 For example, purely economic misconduct, such
as dissipation of marital funds by one party, is clearly relevant to
a court assigning marital property. 119 However, noneconomic
misconduct that has an economic effect on marital assets may also
be considered, even when traditional fault grounds have been
removed from consideration.120 So, while a party’s infidelity on its
own may be irrelevant, the use of marital funds to finance the

113. See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution
Doctrine, 41 A.L.R.4th 481, § 3 (1985). There are circumstances where
property accrued during the course of the marriage is not considered
community or marital property; however, the determination of what
constitutes marital property to be divided upon divorce is beyond the scope of
this article.
114. See Turner, supra note 72, at 117.
115. See Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. 1974).
116. See Hatayama v. Hatayama, 818 P.2d 277, 282 (Haw. App. 1991).
117. See Robert D. Lang, Marital Fault and Equitable Distribution: Two
Unrelated Concepts, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 36 (1994).
118. See Turner, supra note 72, at 119.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 120.
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affair can still be considered. 121 This is consistent with the
UMDA’s “business partnership” model because, while fault
pertaining to the dissolution of the partnership is of no matter,
one partner’s misuse of the business’s funds certainly is. 122
A. Equitable Division versus Equal Division
There is an important distinction between equitable division
of the assets and equal division of the assets that is relevant when
considering the goals of no-fault divorce and how a jurisdiction’s
choice of standard when dividing marital property is significant.
Most states, including Rhode Island, follow an equitable division
standard.123 While intuitively an equitable division standard
suggests that marital property should be divided based on the
contribution of each party to the marital estate (similar to the idea
of an equity contribution to a business or personal property, like a
mortgage), the idea of an “equitable division” has been interpreted
much more broadly and in favor the colloquial definition of the
word: “dealing fairly or equally with all concerned.” 124
Accordingly, many judges depart from an equal division of the
marital property so as to “do the fairest thing given the
circumstances.” 125
There is a compelling argument that an equitable division
standard, by its very nature, opens the door to a consideration of
fault when dividing marital assets. In his article, Distribution of
Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions: Equitable
Doesn’t Equal Equal, James Ratner, professor at University of
Arizona’s James E. Rogers College of Law, addressed these
concerns. 126 He stated that equitable division undermines the
purpose of the community property approach altogether, the crux
of which is that each spouse is entitled to “undivided present
121. Id. at 119. “While the mere fact that the husband had an
extramarital affair is irrelevant, the fact that the husband spent $10,000 in
marital property taking a cruise with his paramour can still be considered.”
Id.
122. Id. at 118.
123. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16.1 (West 2006).
124. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 392 (10th ed. 1993).
125. James R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in Community
Property Jurisdictions: Equitable Doesn’t Equal Equal, 72 LA. L. REV. 21, 23
(2011).
126. See generally id.
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ownership of all community assets, regardless of which spouse
generated the asset and the behavior of the spouse during the
marriage.” 127 Considering this universally accepted underlying
goal, as evidenced by a uniform shift to recognizing marital
property as the property of both parties, it is interesting that an
equal division of marital assets is the minority approach.128 In
fact, only three states (California, Louisiana, and New Mexico)
follow a strict equal division of the marital estate, regardless of
who contributed more. 129 An equitable division of the assets,
according to Ratner, gives divorce courts “open-ended and largely
unreviewable equitable discretion concerning division of
community worth [which] undermines horizontal equity, renders
property division at divorce a high-stakes judicial lottery, and
likely raises the costs of obtaining a divorce”—all things that nofault divorce and a community property approach, sought to
minimize. 130 Of course, these standards and considerations only
become relevant if the parties cannot come to an agreement on the
division of the marital assets on their own.
B.

Dividing Marital Property in Rhode Island

In addition to applying an equitable division standard, Rhode
Island is among the minority of jurisdictions that permits a
consideration of fault in assigning property and awarding alimony
without requiring an explicit showing that the misconduct had an
adverse economic impact on any marital assets. 131 Rhode Island
law provides that while fault is not to be considered when
granting a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, a
127. Id. at 34.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 35.
131. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-5-16.1 (West 2006). According to a
study entitled “The Role of Marital Misconduct in Dividing Property Upon
Divorce” done by the National Legal Research Group, which appeared in 15
No. 7 Divorce Litig. 117, seventeen jurisdictions consider any type of marital
misconduct when dividing marital property: Alabama, Connecticut,
Washington DC, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Id. Three states—Arkansas,
Kansas, and New York—require that conduct meet a certain threshold (such
as “egregious” or “gross and extreme”) before it can be considered. Id.
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consideration of fault is preserved for assignment of property,
alimony, and legal fees. 132 Rhode Island courts have routinely
allowed the admission of marital misconduct in hearings
pertaining to property assignment and the shares of the marital
estate awarded in light of such conduct suggests a trend: spouses
who misbehave (overwhelmingly, the husband) are punished for
their conduct with an unfavorable assignment of property or an
otherwise unnecessary award of alimony. 133
A review of Rhode Island case law suggests that a broad
range of fault has been considered when assigning marital
property and awarding alimony. In assigning marital property,
the court must first determine which assets are marital
properties; it must then consider the factors set forth in section
15-5-16.1(a); and finally, it will distribute the property.134 The
statute states that one of the twelve factors that the court is to
consider when dividing marital property is “the conduct of the
parties during the marriage.” 135 Although Rhode Island courts
have interpreted the term “conduct” to include both good and bad
behavior by both parties throughout the course of the marriage, 136
the conduct relied on is, more often than not, bad behavior.
For example, in Wrobleski v. Wrobleksi, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld the wife’s award of 60% of the marital
estate (valued at approximately $2.2 million), and an alimony
award of $5,000 per month for five years and $2,000 thereafter
until a further order, despite the fact that the wife “posses[ed]
sufficient earning ability as a teacher.”137 The wife was not in
need of rehabilitation, as alimony is intended for; instead, her
alimony was awarded based largely on her husband’s alleged
alcohol problem, extramarital affair, and time spent “at work or
out socially away from his family” which led to the deterioration of
132. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006).
133. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274 (R.I. 2007),
Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160 (R.I. 1994).
134. See Horton v. Horton, 891 A.2d 885, 889 (R.I. 2006); Koutroumanos
v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 1096 (R.I. 2005); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811
A.2d 1138, 1141 (R.I. 2002). This paper is limited to considering the second
step of the process, wherein the factors set forth in section 15-5-16.1(a) are
applied.
135. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-5-16.1(a)(2).
136. See Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 561 (R.I. 1984) (citations omitted).
137. 653 A.3d 732, 733 (R.I. 1995).
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their marriage. 138 Evidence of a husband’s extramarital affair,
including that he had brought his new romantic partner around
the couple’s children, was similarly considered by the court in
Vicario v. Vicario, and the wife was ultimately awarded 60% of the
marital estate despite the fact that, even including consideration
of the wife’s homemaking services, the husband contributed more
financially to the value of the estate. 139 Similarly, in Giammarco
v. Giammarco, the Court upheld a general magistrate’s award of
only 35% of the marital estate to a wife that was found “to be
totally at fault in the breakdown of the marriage.” 140 DeAngelis v.
DeAngelis is yet another example of an inequitable division of
assets based largely in traditional fault based notions. 141 In that
case, the Court upheld an award of 80% of the marital estate to
the wife based on the trial court’s finding that the husband was
“solely at fault for the deterioration of the marriage.” 142 Central
to the court’s considerations was the husband’s alleged alcoholism
and infidelity, as well as other “egregious” behavior. 143
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did seem to get
the analysis right in Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes. 144 There, the
Court upheld an equal division of the marital estate, save for
$77,000 in debt assigned to the husband that was a result of his
“reckless investment practices” achieved “primarily by taking cash
advances against credit cards to purchase stocks.” 145 In assigning
the marital estate, the Court did not appear to consider any type
of non-economic fault, including the fact that the husband had
pled nolo contendere to domestic assault at one time during the
course of the marriage. 146
Interestingly, the Koutroumanos trial was bifurcated, with
one hearing as to the dissolution of the marriage and custody of
the parties’ children and another as to the division of the marital
assets. 147 This presents a potentially promising process by which
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
901 A.2d 603, 606, 608 (R.I. 2006).
959 A.2d 531, 534 (R.I. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
923 A.2d. 1274 (R.I. 2007).
Id. at 1281–82.
Id.

865 A.2d at 1091, 1099 (R.I. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1094.
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fault can become as far removed as possible when determining
division of marital assets. If the determination as to whether the
differences between the couple are irreconcilable (thus warranting
a divorce) is made at one trial, even if traditional fault-based
factors are considered (as precedent suggests they are), they need
not be considered when dividing the marital property if that
determination is made at a second hearing. This would insulate
fault-based considerations from the process as much as is likely
possible.
Perhaps where a party opts to plead, and can prove, fault in a
divorce pursuant to section 15-5-2 of the Rhode Island General
Laws,148 he or she should get the benefit of using that same fault
to his or her advantage when dividing marital assets. That is the
approach taken in Texas, though only to a certain extent; an
appellate court there has held that although fault is a factor when
dividing the marital asset when it is pleaded and proven in a
divorce, “an unequal division of the community estate may not be
awarded to punish the party at ‘fault.’” 149 However, when a party
decides on the no-fault route, whatever the motivation, this should
foreclose the opportunity to introduce fault for the purposes of
dividing marital property. After all, you can’t have your cake and
eat it too.
C.

Make it Equal, or at Least More Equitable

The explicit consideration of fault when determining property
assignment, alimony, legal fees, and child custody clearly
undermines the underlying goals of no-fault divorce. It
148. Section 15-5-2 of the R.I. General Laws states:
Divorces from the bond of marriage shall also be decreed for the
following causes: (1) Impotency; (2) Adultery; (3) Extreme cruelty; (4)
Willful desertion for five (5) years of either of the parties, or for
willful desertion for a shorter period of time in the discretion of the
court; (5) Continued drunkenness; (6) The habitual, excessive, and
intemperate use of opium, morphine, or chloral; (7) Neglect and
refusal, for the period of at least one year next before the filing of the
petition, on the part of the husband to provide necessaries for the
subsistence of his wife, the husband being of sufficient ability; and
(8) Any other gross misbehavior and wickedness, in either of the
parties, repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant.
149. See Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. App. 2002)
(citations omitted).

KRUGERFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/20/2014 2:02 PM

REMOVING FAULT FROM DIVORCE

833

incentivizes parties facing separation to keep a score card of poor
behavior, vet out details of indiscretions, and further swells the
already amplified wave of emotions that parties to a divorce are
experiencing. To counter this phenomenon, equal division of
marital property, as used in California, 150 Louisiana, 151 and New
Mexico, 152 would be the ideal standard. Applying an equal
division standard would decrease litigation length and costs in two
ways: it would remove unnecessary litigation pertaining to fault,
as well as eliminate litigation pertaining to who contributed what
percentage to the marital estate. The only necessary
determination left to make would be what constitutes marital
property. While there would still be some litigation pertaining to
this issue, it would be minimal in comparison to that surrounding
fault and contribution, and would not directly undermine the
goals of no-fault divorce.
If equal division of the assets is too drastic a transformation
for the Rhode Island General Assembly, there is still hope: the
current equitable division standard can be vastly improved so as
to coincide with the goals of no-fault divorce. First, a true
equitable division standard can be used—one which considers only
the contributions of the parties to the marital estate, without any
other consideration of fault. For example, a Michigan case
overturned an inequitable award of the marital estate to a
husband based largely on the wife’s infidelity during the marriage
because the court gave too much weight to findings of fault when
dividing the marital property.153 The court reasoned that “[a]
woman who was an effective partner through a quarter of a
century, assisting in the acquisition of assets, and employed
throughout, is entitled to a more equal disposition.” 154 Although
this court suggests fault may be one of many factors to consider
when dividing property, it notes that fault of either party is
certainly not “dispositive.” 155 Be that as it may, the strong
dissent in that case is exactly on point, advocating to remove fault
from the process entirely, stating that continuing to allow fault in
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004).
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (2008).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (West 2006).
See Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 903 (Mich. 1992).
Id.
Id.
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hearings for marital assignments would result in “divorce
proceeding[s] [to] again become a forum for finger-pointing and
ventilating grievances, and the law return[ing] full circle to where
it was immediately before the Legislature enacted the no-fault
statute.” 156
One primary concern with the equitable division standard is
the idea that parties who don’t contribute financially to a
marriage (overwhelmingly women) are severely disadvantaged
upon separation and divorce where the relevant law divides assets
based solely on contribution to the marital estate. However,
inclusion of a party’s contribution and services as a homemaker in
statutes guiding property assignment, present in the Rhode Island
statute, helps protect parties whose contributions have been
largely, or solely, within the home.157 Additionally, alimony
persists as a rehabilitative measure for parties who were “absent
from employment while fulfilling homemaking responsibilities”
with specific consideration given to “the extent to which any
education, skills, or experience of that party have become
outmoded and his or her earning capacity diminished.” 158
Rhode Island law already includes wasteful dissipation of
assets as a consideration when dividing property consistent with
the UMDA’s business model approach.159 Further, I would be
remiss to say that it is unreasonable for courts to consider
misconduct when assigning property when the behavior is
particularly egregious. New York law provides a promising
framework for this standard, considering both economic
misconduct and egregious behavior, evincing a very high standard
for the latter. In finding that fault would be difficult to determine
and unnecessarily time consuming, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled in O’Brien v. O’Brien that marital fault should not
ordinarily be considered in equitable distribution. 160 However,
New York courts have preserved the consideration of “egregious
fault” and that which has resulted in dissipation of marital
assets. 161 New York courts have set a very high bar for egregious
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 905 (Levin, J., dissenting).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-5-16.1(a)(4) (West 2006).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16.1(a)(11) (West 2006).
489 N.E.2d 712, 719 (N.Y. 1985).
See Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113–14 (N.Y. App.

KRUGERFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

REMOVING FAULT FROM DIVORCE

4/20/2014 2:02 PM

835

fault, and have considered only misconduct that “shocks the
conscience,” 162 such as a husband attacking his wife with a knife
and inflicting numerous serious wounds resulting in surgery and
therapy 163 and a husband, who was a practicing attorney,
planning a failed attempt in which he bribed a Romanian terrorist
to kill his wife,164 as meeting the threshold. A New York appellate
court has indicated that satisfying the “egregious fault” standard
is rare, holding that adultery alone is generally insufficient. 165
This heightened standard, while preserving fault to some extent,
would flush out a majority of the tireless litigation that no-fault
divorce sought to eliminate.
V. CONCLUSION

Certainly there is no perfect solution to divorce litigation.
Even if the no-fault system were working flawlessly, evidence of
fault and marital misconduct would likely not be absent from the
process entirely. Anyone familiar to divorce litigation knows that,
regardless of whether it is expressly considered or not, when fault
is alleged by either or both of the parties, it will be used as a
backhand bargaining chip to gain an advantage in litigation. But,
the less that traditional notions of fault are relied on throughout
the process, the closer we will be to achieving the material goals of
the no-fault system: quicker, more cost-efficient divorce litigation,
and, to the extent possible, more harmonious relationships. After
all, wouldn’t the world be a much better place for everyone if we
could just get along with our exes?

Div. 1984).
162. Id. at 114.
163. See Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk
Co. 1984).
164. See Brancoveanu v. Brancoveanu, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988).
165. See Weilert v. Weilert, 562 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
“While the defendant herein may not have been a model husband or ideal
father, this is not one of those rare cases where marital fault should have
entered into the equitable distribution equation.” Id.

